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WHEN SHOULD SEAMEN MAINTENANCE AND
CURE BENEFITS TERMVINATE?
Jason MinAin"
INTRODUCTION
Under general maritime law, a ship owner has a legal duty to provide both
medical care and treatment to any seaman who becomes ill or injured
while in the service of the ship.' This duty, commonly kmown as
maintenance and cure, extends from the onset of the seaman's illness or
injury until the point at which he is cured.2 The ship owne s duty,
however, is not open-ended? In the event the seaman is diagnosed with
an incurable disease or disability, the shipowners duty to provide
maintenance and cure continues no longer than the point at which the
seaman has reached maximum medical improvement Plotting the point
of maximum medical improvement, however, is a troublesome task both
factually and as a matter of law.5
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court in Vella v. Ford Motor
Co.,6 tried to resolve the longstanding debate over when a seaman has
reached the point of maximum medical improvement In Vella, the Court
declared that maximum medical improvement occurs at such time as the
seaman's disease or injury is declared to be permanent, and only then is
the ship owner relieved from any further obligation to provide maintenance
and cure.7
"Staff Writer, JouRnal oFHmTCARLAw. BA., University of linnesota, 1994; JD. (Cand.)
DeFaul University College of Law, 1998.
1 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525,527 (1938).
2 Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5 (1975).
3 Belcher Towing Co. v. Howard, 638 F. Supp. 242,243 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
4 Vella, 421 U.S. at 5. Maximum medical improvement is also referred to as "maximum cure"
and "maximum medical recovery." The terms are used interchangeably by courts and
commentators.
5 Pelotto v. L & NTowing Co., 604 F.2d 396,406 (5th Cir. 1979).
6 Vella, 421 U.S. 1 (1975).
7Ia at5.
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In July 1996, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in Costa Crociere v. Rose,' circumvented the Supreme
Court's permanency rule when it denied a shipowner's request to terminate
maintenance and cure for a seaman diagnosed with an incurable and
permanent kidney disorder The issue in Costa Crociere was whether the
shipowner remained obligated to pay for the seaman's dialysis treatment,
or a possible organ transplant, since the seaman had reached the point of
maximum medical improvement as defined by Vella.1 Refusing to be
restricted by the permanency confines of Vella, the Costa Crociere court
declared that a shipowner's obligation to provide maintenance and cure
should continue until it has been medically determined the injured or ill
seaman can no longer improve his overall medical condition, and not just
the specific disease or ailments from which he suffers."
The Costa Crociere decision marked the Florida court's first
exploration of the doctrine of maintenance and cure in the context of an
incurable, life threatening disorder. 2 If the case is appealed, it. is uncertain
how the Eleventh Circuit will rule.
The goal of this paper is to provide a general, yet hopefully
insightful, discussion of maximum medical improvement in light of the
court's ruling in Costa Crociere. The second section of this paper will
address the seaman's right and the shipowner's duty to provide
maintenance and cure. Section three will discuss maximum medical
improvement in general, and trace significant court decisions on the
permanency rule. This section will also focus on how the Second, Third,
8 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
9 Id- at 1558-59.
"l. at 1539. The Court in Vella sought guidance from both Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S.
511 (1949) and Article IV, Paragraph I of the Shipowner's Liability Convention, Oct. 24, 1936,
54 Stat. 1696, T.S. No. 951, when it held that maintenance and cure should continue until the point
the seaman's incapacity is declared to be permanent See Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5
(1975).
" Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1550.
12 Id. at 1549.
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Fifth and Seventh Circuits have ruled on the permanency issue. In
particular, the Fifth Circuit's Pelotto test will be examined. Finally, this
article will look at the Costa Crociere v. Rose decision and analyze how
the outcome of this case may impact the doctrine of maintenance and cure.
THE DOCTRINE OF MAINTENANCE AND CURE
The general maritime law doctrine of "maintenance and cure" is the
policy of providing a seaman,13 who is disabled by illness or injury while
in the service of his ship, both medical care and treatment as well as the
means of maintaining himself during the period of his convalescence.' 4
This doctrine is of ancient origin,' s dating back to the Middle Ages 'when
various sea codes provided special protection for mariners 'who were
njured, or became ill, while in the service of their ship.16 Article VI of the
13 To receive maintenance and cure, the injured or ill employee must first establish seaman
status. Exactly who qualifies as a seaman is a controversial issue that has divided courts over the
span oftwo centuries. See McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337,344 (1991));
See also Edward M. Bull, Seaman Status Revisited: A Practical Guide To Status Determination,
6 U.S.F. MAR. L.. 547, 562-72 (1994) (providing an overview of thejudicial debate amongst
various circuits in determining seaman status). In the absence of a congressional determination
of seaman status, the primary guide has been the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. THOMAs J. SC HOENBAUM, ADMnmALTY AND hUPSMi LAW, 4-9 at 199 (2d ed. 1994).
Recently, in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (1995), the United States Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the continuing conflict among the Courts of Appeal concerning the
appropriate criteria for determining seaman status. In Cliandris, the Court established a two-
pronged seaman status criteria test: (1) the employee's duties must contribute to the function ofthe
vessel or to the accomplishment of its missio;, and (2) the employee must have a connection to a
vessel in navigation (or an identifiable fleet of vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its
duration and nature. IdM at 2190. For a thorough evaluation of the factors necessary to establish
seaman status, see generally, THOMS . SCHOEBAUM, AMMIRALTY AND MARITIE LA.W,' 4-9,
pp. 198-218 (2d ed. 1994).
14 Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,531 (1962).
ts Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1547.
16 Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas 426,428 (D. Mass. 1832) (No. 11, 641) (drawing reference To
ARICLE"VI OF THELAWS OF OLEROhN and ARTICLE XVII OFTHELAWS OF WISBUY).
325
326 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 1:323
Laws of Oleron, 17 for example, provided that if a seaman became ill or
njured while in the service ofhis ship, "themaster ought to set him ashore,
to provide lodging and candlelight for him ... and likewise to afford him
such diet as is usual in ship."'" Article XVfI of the Laws of Wisbur9
similarly stated, if a seaman "being ashore in the master's or the ship's
service, if he should happen to be wounded, he shall be maintained and
cured at the charge of the ship."20 The concept of maintenance and cure
was originally brought over from England after the War of Independence,
and has since evolved into a common law right under American maritime
jurisprudence The current doctrine is also reinforced by Article II of the
Shipowner's Liability ConventionP that "obliges shipowners to pay
compensation to seamen who are injured or fall sick during their
employment'"2
17 CLECRA, JUGimNS D'OLERON, ARTICLEVI.
Is Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1547 (citing CLEmRAC, JUGMENS D'OLERON, ARTICLE VI).
19 THE LAWS OF ,VISBURY, ARTICLE XVIII.
20 Reed, 20 F. Cas. at 428.
21 Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1547. See 46 U.S.C. § 1102 (1936) for a comprehensive
annotation on maintenance, cure, and wages.
' The Shipowner's Liability Convention, supra note 10.
23 SCHOENBAM, supra note 13, at 293. Article H was ratified and proclaimed by President
Roosevelt on October 29, 1939. It provides: [1] The shipowner shall be liable in respect of- (a)
sickness and injury occurring between the date specified in the articles of agreement for reporting
for duty and the termination of the engagement; (b) death resulting from such sickness or injury.
[2] Provided that national laws or regulations may make exceptions in respec' . of: (a) injury
incurred otherwise than in the service of the ship; (b) injury or sickness due to the willful act,
default or misbehavior of the sick injured or deceased person; (c) sickness or infirmity
intentionally concealed when the engagement is entered into. [3] National laws or regulations may
provide thatthe shipowner shall not be liable in respect of sickness, or death directly attributable
to sickness, if at the time of the engagement the person employed refused to be medically
examined. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 736 (1943) (citing Article II of the
Shipowner's Liability Convention, supra note 10). Most courts do not consider the Convention
to supersede the general maritime law. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. § 36,41 (1943) (determining that the Convention confirmed general maritime law).
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The Seaman's Right To Maintenance And Cure
A seaman's right to maintenance and cure is implicit in the contractual
relationship between the seaman and his employer. 4 To recover under
this doctrine, the seaman must prove he suffered illness or injury or that
his disability was aggravated, or became manifest while he was in the
service of the ship.- This doctrine does not require the seaman be
physically aboard the vessel at the time of his injury or illness because
courts consider the seaman to be in the service of the ship when ashore,
even on liberty, provided the seaman is subject to the master's recalL.26
The term "maintenance," as applied here, refers to a per diem
subsistence allowance designed to provide an ill or injured seaman with
compensation sufficient to cover food or lodging during the time he is
unfit for duty -7 If the seaman requires medical attention from a land-
based physician, maintenance benefits encompass the reasonable cost of
14 Calmar S.S. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525,527-28 (1983); Maintenance and cure provisions need
notbe expressly stated in the employment contract. So long as the employee establishes seaman
status, he is legally entitled to maintenance and cure.
2 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 296, n. 1 (citing Miller v. Lykes Bros-Ripley S.S. Co., 98
F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1938)).
'Floyd B. Chapman and Timothy P. Grob, ALDS, Tc Doctrinc OfMnnlenance and Cure, and
Maritime EmploymentDiscrimination: CIartingA Course Between SqyIta and Chaqbdir, 24 U.
MNIfAz mm-AM. L. REv. 325,353 (citing Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511,516 (1949)).
See also Koistiner v. American Export Lines, Inc., 83 N.Y.S2d 297 (194S) (awarding
maintenance and cure to aseaman vho injured himself'when he was forced to flee a brothel after
a dispute arose overfees). With regard to the in the service of the ship issu% the Court in Farrell
stated that a seaman was in the service of the ship provided he was generally answerable to the call
of duty at the time of the accident. Farrell, 336 U.S. at 516. The determination of whether a
seaman is in the service of the ship and answerable to the call of duty at the time of the accident
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Baker v. Ocean Systems, In, 454
F.2d 379, 384(5th Cir. 1972). InAguilarv. Standard Oil Co, 318 U.S. 724 (1943), for example,
the Court considered a seaman to be in the service of the ship when he injured hinself as he
returned to the vessel on an authorized shore leave in a foreign port. The Court reasoned even if
the seaman had been on his own personal business ashore, he was still subject to the call of duty
as a seaman, and earning wages as such. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 732.
1 Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,531 (1962).
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food and lodging comparable to that received aboard the vessel.28
"Cure," on the other hand, represents the actual cost of medical
attention, including the services of physicians and nurses, as well as the
cost of hospitalization, medicines, and medical apparatus.29 A seaman,
under maintenance and cure, also receives the wages he would have
earned had he been able to complete the contractual terms of his
employment.0 These wages are guaranteed from the time of illness or
injury until the end of the seaman's period of employment or until he
becomes fit for duty, whichever occurs first.31
The Shipowner's Duty To Provide Maintenance And Cure 2
The duty to provide maintenance and cure is imposed on every seaman's
employer? 3 The rationale behind this obligation was discussed for the
'Farrell, 336 U.S. at 518; Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146, 150 (5th
Cir. 1962).
' See Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1986).
30 Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, 653 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1981).
31 Warrenv. United States, 75 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. MASS.. 1948). In addition to a claim for
maintenance and cure, if a seaman becomes ill or injured while in the service of the ship, he may
also pursue a civil claim fornegligence under the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (1994), and a
claim for unseaworthiness ofthe vessel. Under appropriate circumstances, a seawran may invoke
all three remedies against the shipowner. Damages, however, are adjusted to prevent double
recovery. For an overview of the Jones Act and of the general maritime claim for
unsearworthiness, see generally, SCHOENBAUM,Ksupra note 13, at249-288.
" For many years prior to the 1980s, seamen who became ill or injured while working on
United States documented vessels received free medical care in the United States Public Health
Service Hospitals which have since closed. In re The Matter of Cooper/T, Smith Stevedoring Co.,
942 F. Supp. 267,269 (E.D. La. 1996). Today, many seamen receive medical bnefits through
insurance plans offered through union membership. Id. If a seaman is not a member of a union
or the expenses are not paid for under the union's insurance plan, the expenses must be paid by
the employer. See Macedo v. FV Paul & Michelle, 868 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989); Caulfield v. A
C & D Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1981).
33 Morales v. Garijak, 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that upon notification of
the seaman's claim for maintenance and cure, the shipowner need not immediately commence
payments. The shipowner may investigate and require corroboration of the seaman' s illness or
328
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first time in 1832 in the case of Harden v. Gordon 4 In Harden, the
circuit court of Maine cautioned all courts should watch with jealousy an
encroachment upon the rights of seamen because these individuals "are by
the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of
climate, exposure to perils, and from exhausting labor" -5 Relying on this
rationale, courts since Harden have liberally interpreted the maintenance
and cure doctrine "for the benefit and protection of seamen who are their
wards."36
In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 7 for example, the United States Supreme
Court referred to a shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure as
"pervasive!' The Court found liability should not be defeated by
restrictive distinctions nor should it be narrowly confined?3 Likewise, in
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.,39 the Supreme Court emphasized that,
whenever resolving disputes over maintenance and cure, "if leeway is to
be given in either direction, all the considerations which brought the
liability into being, dictate it should be on the sailor's behalf. "9
Today, the duty to provide maintenance and cure is absolute and does
injury). Id at 1358 (citing McWilliams v. Texaco, Inc., 781 F.2d 514,518-20(Sth Cir. 1986)).
Pursuantto investigation of the seaman's claim, if the shipowner unreasonably rejects the claim,
he may be liable forboth maintenance and cure payments and compensatory damages, stemming
from the aggravation of the seaman' s condition. Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358 (citing Vaughan v.
A-tinson, 369 U.S. 527,530 (1962)).
1 Harden v. Gorden, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
"Id at 483 (stating that with respect to seamen, "they are generally poor and friendless, and
acquire habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. Ifsome provision is not made
for them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the
accumulated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of suitable
nourishment Their common earnings in many instances are wholly inadequate to provide for the
expenses of sickness").
6Costa Crocierev. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538,1547 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Vaughan, 369 U.S.
527,531-32 (1982)).
37 Vaughan, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
" Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1547 (citing Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531-32).
" Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
4 I at 735.
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not depend on whether or not the shipowner was negligent.41 Rather,
maintenance and cure is required without regard to fault,"2 and
contributory negligence on the part of the seaman will not prevent a full
recovery 3  except in cases of willful misconduct. Moreover, the
seaman's illness or injury need not be associated necessarily with his
occupation.45 The obligation to pay maintenance and cure can arise from
a pre-existing medical condition such as a heart problem, a prior illness
that recurs during the seaman's employment, or an injury suffered on
shore, as long as the condition manifests itself while the seaman is in the
service of the ship. 6 Regardless of the inherent cause or nature of the
injury, the shipowner's duty to pay maintenance and cure terminates as
soon as the seaman reaches the point of maximum medical improvement.47
MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT
Once the seaman has established his right to maintenance and cure, the
burden of proof shifts to the shipowner to demonstrate that the seaman
has reached the point of maximum medical improvement." Maximum
41rd. at 730.
4 Seville v. United States, 163 F.2d 296,298-99 (9th Cir. 1947).
1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 13, at 291, n. 18 (citing John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Erickson,
261 F. 986 (2d Cir. 1919)).
4Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1949). See also Silmon v. Can Do l, Inc.,
89 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a seaman's injury resulting from illegal intravenous drug
use constituted willful misconduct precluding award of maintenance and cure).
45 Farrell, 336 U.S. at 516.
46 SCHOEBAM, supra note 13, at 293, n. 29 (citing Breese v. AWI, Inc., 823 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1987)). Maintenance and cure benefits may be denied if, at the time of hiring, the seaman
intentionally conceals the injury or ailment that manifests itself while in the service of the ship.
McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Co., 396 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 894 (1968).
47 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724,730 (1943).
41 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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medical improvement is a medical determination, not a legal one"9; and,
as a matter of procedure, the rule requires the shipowner to seek a
declaration stating the seaman has reached the point ofmaximum medical
cure from the seaman's treating physician The shipowner must then file
an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act"' to determine whether he
can terminate the seaman's benefits.
Paving the Road From ReedTo Vella
Throughout history, courts have adopted various formulations of
maximum medical improvement.' In 1832, the Circuit Court for the
District of Massachusetts in Reed v. Canfield 4 established the majority
rule, which lasted more than a century. In Reed, a seaman suffered
frostbite while rowing to shore from the defendant's ship.- In determining
when the obligation to provide maintenance and cure should cease, the
court declared in dicta56 that the ship owner was "liable only for expenses
4 9 Breese v. AWL, Inc., 823 F.2d I00, 104-05 (19S7). See also, Tullos %. Resource Drilling
Inc., 750 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing the termination of a seaman's right to
maintenance and cure should be based on an unequivocal medical determination).
5 SCHOENBAU' ,supra note 13, at 307, n. 9 (citing Gillikin v. United State, 764 F. Supp. 261,
268 (E.D. N.Y. 1991)).
5128 U.S.C.' 2201 (1994).
-1 LancasterTowing, Inc. v. Davis, 681 F. Supp. 387, 388 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
"Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
'4 Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas. 426 (C.C. Mass. 1832) (No. 11, 641). While attempting to
delineate the extent of the shipowner's obligation, Justice Story wrote: MThe sickmss or other
injury may occasion a temporary orpermanent disability; but that is nota ground for indemnity
from the shipowners. They are liable only for expenses necessarily incurred for the cure; and
when the care is completed, at least so far as the ordinary medical means extend, the shipowners
are freed from all further liability..." Id. at 429.
3 Id. at 426.
5 The main issue in Reed was whether the shipovner was obligated to provide the seaman
maintenance and cure since he did not injure himself during the actual voyage and the vessel was
not abroad. Id. at 428. The fact the voyage had ended and the vessel was anchored in port did not
preclude the seaman from claiming maintenance and cure. Id.
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necessarily incurred for the cure; and when the cure is completed, at least
so far as the ordinary medical means extend, the [ship owners are freed
from all further liability. '57 The decision in Reed, however, was not
universally recognized5  Other courts held that a shipowner's duty to
provide maintenance and cure extended no longer than the seaman's right
to wages under his employment contract.59
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court in Calmar SS. Corp. v.
Taylor6" temporarily resolved this debate by declaring maintenance and
cure should continue for a "fair time" after the voyage." The seaman in
Calmar was diagnosed with Buerger's Disease, an incurable and fatal
disease affecting the veins and arteries.62 Faced with the issue of whether
the shipowner was obligated to provide a lump sum payment to finance
the seaman's medical treatment for the remainder of his lif, the Court
determined "the award of a lump sum in anticipation of the continuing
need of maintenance and cure for life or an indefinite period is without
support in judicial decision."'63 The Court reasoned tha. lump sum
payments were difficult to calculate; and, in the case of Buerger's disease,
such determinations could not be measured by reference to mortality
tables.' The Court also cautioned that an improvident seaman might be
induced to spend his award on things unrelated to medical care65; and the
57Id. at 429.
58 William . Welte, Maintenance and Cure: The Third Count of The Seaman's Complaint, 7
SUFFOLKTI'ANSNAT'L L.L, 1, 40, n. 71 (1983).
9 See, e.g., The Atlantic, 2 F. Cas. 121,132 (S.D. N.Y. 1849) (No. 620) (holding; that an injured
seaman had no claim against shipowner once the obligation to pay the seaman's wages terminated);
Nevittv. Clarke, 18 F. Cas. 29,32 (S.D. N.Y. 1846) (No. 10, 138) (holding that a seaman's right
to maintenance and cure is concurrent with his right to wages).
6 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
61Id. at 531.
62 Id at 526.
OId. at 530.
64Id. at 531.
"Welte, supra note 58, at 42 (1983) (citing Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 531
(1938)).
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Court concluded, "we can find no basis for saying that if the disease
proves to be incurable, the duty extends beyond a fair time after the
voyage in which to effect an improvement in the seaman's condition as
reasonably may be expected to result from nursing, care, and medical
treatment.166
While the Supreme Court in Calmar attempted to clarify the
ambiguities "concerning the duration of a ship owneres obligation to
provide maintenance and cure, the Courtes use of such words as fair and
reasonable still failed to provide a definitive solution to the problem."17
In 1949, however, the Supreme Court clarified the duration issue in
Farrell v. United States" where a seaman suffered both total and
permanent blindness and post-traumatic epileptic convulsions after falling
into a dry-dock.69 Confronted with the inevitable consequence of the
seaman requiring medication to ease headaches and epileptic convulsions
for the remainder of his life, the Court upheld the lower court's
determination that "the duty of a shipowner to furnish maintenance and
cure does not extend beyond the time when the maximum cure possible
has been effected. 7 On reaching its decision, the Court relied on Article
IV of the Shipowner's Liability convention,71 limiting a shipowner's
66 Calnar, 303 U.S. at 530.
1 Welte, supra note 58, at43 (citing G. ROBINSON,HADBOOKOFADMRmALTYLAW, 39, at
299 (1939)).
68 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
59 Id. at 512-13.
73'Id.
7 The Shipownees Liability Convention, supra note 10. The Shipone's Liability Convention
was ratified by the United States and pro claimed by the President as effective for the United States
on Oct. 29,1939. Farrell, 336 U.S. at517. ArticleIV Section I of the Conventionprmides. The
shipowner shall be liable to defray the expense of medical care and maintenance until the sick or
injured person has been cured, or until the sickmess or incapacity has been declared ofapermanent
nature." Id (citing Article IV, Paragraph I of the Shipomnee's Liability Convention, supra note
10).
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liability to the time at which the ill or injured seaman has been cured, or
until his disease or injury is declared permanent.72
Article IV of the Shipowner's Liability Convention was not the only
factor considered by the Court in Farrell. In addition, the Court also
reasoned that maintenance and cure was intended to provide only limited
benefits to the seaman,73 and "does not hold a ship[owner] to permanent
liability for a pension; neither does it give a lump sum payment to offset
disability based on some conception of life expectancy." 74
Finally, the Court emphasized that maintenance and cure was not the
only recourse available to the injured seaman.75 Under the appropriate
circumstances, the Court suggested, a seaman could obtain indemnity or
compensation for his injuries through the Jones Act, or on a claim for
unseaworthiness.76 Consequently, the Farrell Court denied the injured
seaman's claim for future benefits, even though it recognized that he
would require treatment for the remainder of his life.77
Finally, in 1975 the Supreme Court in Vella v. Ford Motor Co.78
reaffirmed Farrell and examined how best to determine the point of
maximum medical improvement. 9 In Vella, the seaman permanently
damaged his inner ear when he slipped and banged his head on an
72 Welt% supra note 58, at 44, (citing Article IV, Paragraph I of the Shipowner's Liability
Convention, supra note 10). Pursuant to the ratification of the Convention, th, Department of
Labor issued a summary of the Convention which stated: "The shipowner is required to funish
medical care and maintenance, including board and lodging, until the disabled person has been
cured or the disability has been declared permanent." Farrell, 336 U.S. at 517-18 (citing G.
ROBiNSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMrALTY LAW,' 39, at 300 (1939)).
"Farrell, 336 U.S. at 519.
74 Id.
75Id.
76 Id. See supra note 23 for a brief overview of the Jones Act and the general maritime claim
of unseaworthiness.
77Farrell, 336 U.S. at 517.
7g421 U.S. 1 (1975).79 Id. at 4.
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electrical box aboard the defendant's ship." Immediately after the
accident, a physician diagnosed the seaman's ear condition as
permanent"' Confronted with the issue of whether a shipowner could
terminate benefits upon a diagnosis of permanency, even when the
diagnosis may be simultaneous to the time of injury, the Court held
"maintenance and cure continues until such time as the incapacity is
declared to be permanent"' Consequently, because the seaman's ear
condition was diagnosed as permanent immediately after the accident, the
shipowner was justified in terminating his benefits."
Next, the Vella Court considered how to determine the point of
maximum medical improvement' Concerned that a shipowner might
withhold needed benefits based on the mistaken belief the seaman had
reached maximum cure, when in fact the seaman was still susceptible to
curative treatment, the Court suggested maximum medical improvement
should be determined pursuant to a medical diagnosis of permanency. 5
The Court reasoned a shipowner's denial of maintenance and cure, when
the seaman's injury, though permanent at the time of the accident "is not
medically diagnosed as permanent until long after its occurrence, would
obviously disserve and frustrate the combined object of encouraging
marine commerce and assuring the well-being of seamen." 5
CurrentlyFella stands for the proposition that a ship owner's duty to
provide maintenance and cure terminates once the seaman's condition is
0Id. at2.
'Id. at 5.
I .L (citing The Shipowner's Liability Convention, supra note 10). In W4lla, the Court also
adopted language from Vitco v. Joncich, 130 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Cal. 1955), alid, 234 F.2d 161
(9th Cir. 1956) (stating the shipowner's obligation to provide maintenance and cure may not be
discharged until the earliest time when it is reasonably and in good faith determined by those
charged with the seaman's care and treatment that maximum care has reasonably been effected).
' Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4 (1975).
84 Welte, supra note 58, at 45.
5ella; 421 U.S. at4.
s Id.
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either cured or diagnosed as permanent." Lower court application of the
permanency standard has proven somewhat difficult, especially since
injuries and ailments are often distinct and susceptible to different forms
oftreatment88 For example, two seamen, both diagnosed with the same
form of curable cancer, may experience different results under the same
mode of treatment. Whereas seaman A responds favorably to
chemotherapy and moves into remission, seaman B does not respond to
the treatment and his condition slowly worsens. Determining when
seaman B's benefits terminate, especially since his form of cancer is
curable, is complicated. As a result, lower courts which are often
confronted with this type of situation, have found it necessary to evaluate
each case on a fact-specific basis.89 Consequently, while the line of cases
extending from Reed to Vella may have paved the road to require a
diagnosis of permanency in maximum medical improvement
determinations, lower court application of the permanency rule has clearly
created some major potholes.
17Id atS.
11 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
89 Id.
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LOWER COURT APPLICATION OF THE
PERMANENCY RULE
While most federal courts allow the shipowner to terminate benefits
pursuant to a medical diagnosis of permanency, some federal courts
continue to search for a more practical standard to be applied in
maintenance and cure actions, especially in the context of an incurable
disease or ailment.0
The Second Circuit Palliative Care Analysis
The Second Circuit applies Vella's permanency rule through a palliative,91
rather than a curative 2 analysis. 3  Thus, the Second Circuit has
determined that so long as the seaman's condition is susceptible to
curative treatment, the shipowner is still liable for maintenance and
cure.94 In Muruaga v. United State, for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied continued maintenance
and cure to a seaman diagnosed with an incurable hypertensive
cardiovascular disease." Faced with the inevitable fact that the seaman
0 Id.
91 The term "palliative" is used to describe pain relieving treatment administered alter the
seaman's condition has been diagnosed as permanent or incurable, Id (relying on McMillan v. Tug
lane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (explainting "as long as the s-aman's
condition is susceptible to curative as opposed to palliative treatment, the ship owner is liable for
maintenance and cure").
92 The term "curative" is used to describe conditions that can be cured through the use of
medicine, surgery, etc. See generally, Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1551-52.
93 See e.g., Muruagav. United States, 171 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1949).
54 Berke v. Lehigh Marine Disposal Corp., 435 F.2d 1073, 1076 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 825 (1971). Interestingly, the Supreme Court in VIlla, left open the question uhether
maintenance and cure may be awarded for palliative medical care to arrest further progress of the
condition or to reduce pain. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5, n. 4 (1975).
9 Afuruaga, 171 F.2d at 320.96Iad
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would require palliative treatment for the remainder of his life, the court
declared "when maintenance and cure has brought about all the
improvement to be expected in an incurable diseasethe shipowner's
liability ends" 97  From this, the court concluded once the seaman's
condition was diagnosed as permanent or incurable, if "the seaman
thereafter needs attention to maintain his improvement at the maximum
level, to assist him in recovery from relapses, or to restrain the progress
of the disease, the shipowner was not bound to provide it."9"
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Desmond v.
United States99 where a seaman was diagnosed with cerebral
arteriosclerosis, an incurable spinal disease.' In determining when
maintenance and cure should cease, the court held the shipowner was
liable for maintenance and cure only until the disease was cured, or
recognized as incurable.' In the event the disease was incurable, the
court stated, "the shipowner had no further liability, whether or not the
seaman required additional treatment to restrain degeneracy or relieve
pain.' 02
9 Id. at 321.
98 Id.
9 217 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955).
00 Iad at 949.101 Id. at 950.
"o2 Id. See also Berke v. Lehigh Marine Disposal Corp., 435 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1970) (since
further treatment for aggravated bronchitis could only relieve symptoms but would not
permanently improve the condition, the seaman had reached maximum medical cure and was not
entitled to continued maintenance and cure); Lindgren v. Shepard S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1940) (continued maintenance and cure treatment denied to a syphilitic who required periodic
examinations for the rest of his life in order to prevent painful relapses, but not to cure the
disease); McMillan v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452,461 (E.D. N.Y. 1995) (where the
court explained as long as the seaman's condition was susceptible to curativ-. as opposed to
palliative treatment, the shipowner was still liable for maintenance and cure).
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Third Circuit "Arrest Further Progress" Analysis
The Third Circuit has applied the permanency rule in a like manner. In
Cox v. Dravo Corp.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected a seaman's claim for continued maintenance and cure once
his injuries were diagnosed as permanent. The seaman in Cox sustained
personal injuries working aboard the defendant's ship.C Due to the
extensive nature ofhis injuries, the seaman was no longer able to perform
strenuous a'ctivity, he suffered headaches and dizzy spells, and relied on
physical therapy and prescription medication to relieve his aches and
pains."'5 After evaluating the seaman's condition, the court concluded the
seaman had reached the point of maximum medical improvement since
the effect of therapy and medication was solely to relieve pain and
discomfort; and no treatment would arrest the seaman's progressively
deteriorating physical condition.1" The court reasoned although it might
be sound social policy for the shipowner to be required to insure against
the cost ofpalliative or preventative care and to be required to provide for
permanently disabled or incurably Ml seaman, the United States Supreme
Court had expressly rejected such a rule. 1 7
The Cox court also explicitly rejected two prior Third Circuit cases,
Neff v. Dravo Corp.08 and Ward v. Union Barge Line Corp!C In both
cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held a
seaman was entitled to maintenance and cure, not only up to the point
when treatment for his illness or injury had achieved maximum recovery
possible; but, thereafter, even if the seaman had become totally and
103 517 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1975).
04 Iad at 622.
105 Id.
1 sId. at 626.
107 Id.
lot 407 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1975).
1o9 443 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir. 1971).
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permanently disabled, so long as medical care would arrest further
progress of the disease or relieve pain.110 The Cox court explicitly rejected
this approach, declaring Neffand Ward "inconsistent with th- limitations
on the maintenance and cure remedy imposed by the United States
Supreme Court and [finding they] must be overrled to the extent of such
inconsistency." 1
Seventh Circuit Stringent "Permanent Medical Disability" Analysis
The Seventh Circuit, like the Second and Third Circuits, has also adopted
a stringent application of the permanency rule. By way of illustration, in
Celia v. United States,"2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit denied continued maintenance and cure benefits to a
seaman diagnosed with polymyositis, an incurable muscle condition." 3
The seaman in Celia injured himself while working aboard a Navy
vessel.114 Rejecting his claim for continued maintenance and cure, the
"
0 Cox v. Dravo Corp. 517 F.2d 620, 622 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1975)
(citing Neffv. Dravo Corp., 407 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1975) and Ward v. Union Bargo Line Corp.,
443 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir. 1971)).
"Id at 620.
"1 998 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1993).
"Id at 420.
114 Id The seaman in Cella was the chief cook aboard the vessel. Although he was fit for duty
at the time he boarded the vessel, he suffered four separate incidents of physicil injury within
thirty-days: (1) he injured his lower back during the downloading of stores from the dock onto the
ship; (2) he burned his hand when he lifted a twenty-quart pot filled with simmering spaghetti
sauce that ultimately spilled onto his hand because the pots handle was coated with melted butter;
(3) he struck his head twice and fell on his buttocks when the vessel, under its own power, broke
the mooring lines tied to the dock; and (4) he injured his lumbar spine while lifting: approximately
ninety pounds ofpot roast from the oven after other crew members refused to help him. Id. While
medical testimony differed as to what actually aggravated the seaman's muscle condition, this
aspect of the case was not relevant to determining the point of maximum medical cure. As long
as the disorder manifested itself while the seaman was in the service of the ship, any other factors,
aside from willful misconduct need not be considered. See, e.g., Silmon v. Can Do II, Inc., 89 F.3 d
240 (5th Cir. 1996) (seaman's injury resulting from illegal IV drug use cortituted willful
misconduct precluding award of maintenance and cure).
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court determined that once diagnosed with a "permanent medical
disability," the seaman was no longer entitled to receive benefits."- The
court reasoned while treatment for the seaman's condition required
maintenance doses of medication, he would never be cured."' On the
basis or this reasoning, the court declared "all meaningful hopes for
recovery had ended and the seaman had reached maximum medical
recovery." 117
Fifth Circuit Application of the Permanency Rule:
The "No Betterment" Test
In 1979, only four years after the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Vella, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
broadened the scope of the permanency rule in Pelotto v. L & N Towing
Co."' InPelotto, the court determined maximum medical improvement
may be achieved only when it appears probable that further treatment
would result in "no betterment of the seaman's condition" 9 In Pelotto,
a seaman severely injured his knee while working aboard a tugboat12
Fully aware his knee injury was incurable, the Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's decision denying the seaman's claim for continued
11 Cela, 998 F.3d at 430.
I16 Id.
17Id. Cases from other circuits adopting the permanency approach include: Hubbard v. Faros
Fisheries, Inc, 626 F.2d 196,201 (1st Cir. 1980) (seaman. was entitled to maintenance and cure
only until his heart condition was diagnosed as permanent); Mitola v. Johns Hopkins Univ.
Applied Physics Lab., 839 F. Supp. 351, 359 (D. Md. 1993) (seaman denied further maintenance
-and cure benefits despite allegations of treatment available to secure againstfuture injury).
11 604 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1979).
,
19 Id at 400. See also Gaspard v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372, 374, n. 3 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. dened, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (where the court, quoting Peloito, stated, "The
accepted legal standard holds that maximum cure is achieved when it app ears probable that further
treatment will result in no betterment of the seaman' s condition").
" Pelotto, 604 F.2.d at 398.
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maintenance and cure.'21 The court reasoned as long as further treatment
would effect an improvement in the condition of his knee," the seaman
was entitled to continued maintenance and cure benefits.12
While the court in Pelotto never explicitly rejected the permanency
rule, the decision to terminate benefits only when it appeared probable
further treatment would result in no betterment of the seaman's
condition, 24 represents a clear expansion of the permanency rule. 125
Under Pelotto, a seaman diagnosed with an incurable or permanent
disorder is not per se denied access to future maintenance and cure
benefits; rather, a court, under Pelotto, must first rule out the possibility
future treatment would not result in a betterment of the seaman's
condition. 26 Fifth Circuit decisions since Pelotto have reirforced this
approach.
In Morales v. Garifak, Inc., 27 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit applied Pelotto in order to extend maintenance and cure
benefits to a seaman who suffered a fractured wrist working aboard the
defendant's ship. 2 8 The seaman's injury resulted in severe pain and
limited motion and function of his wrist.' 29 In deciding whether the
seaman's injured wrist had reached the point of maximum medical
improvement the court determined it would be impossible to fix a precise
date when the seaman would reach maximum cure 30 and noted that
although the seaman's wrist could not heal completely, maintenance and
21 Id. at 400.
12 It can be implied such improvement in the condition of the seaman's knee related to the
functional capacity and range of motion.
2 Pelotto, 604 F.2d at 400.
1 4 Id.
125 See generally, Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
12 Pelotto, 604 P.2d at 400.
127 829 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1987).
12 Id. at 1359-60.
2 Id.
13D Id
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cure would end when the seaman reached the point at which further
treatment would probably not improve his condition."' Based on these
facts, the court concluded since "fither treatment could improve the
overall condition of the seaman's wrist, the defendant was still under a
duty to pay daily maintenance, as well as the medical expenses the seaman
would reasonably incur obtaining treatment for his broken wrist." 132
The court in Williams v. American River Transportation Co.,'
reached a similar conclusion. In TflIfiams, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied Pelotto to extend
maintenance and cure benefits to a seaman diagnosed with a permanent
spinal disorder.134 The seaman in Williams permanently injured his back
while working aboard his employer's ship.13s In determining whether
future back surgery was merely palliative in nature, the court relied on
expert testimony and reasoned that fusion surgery might not only relieve
pain and suffering but also improve the seaman's physical condition and
functional capacity.' As such, the court concluded the seaman had not
yet reached maximum medical cure.137
Though liberal in its application, the Pelotto approach is not without
limitation. In Pelotto itselt the court emphasized that in situations where
"future treatment would merely relieve pain and suffering but not
otherwise improve the seaman's physical condition ... maximum cure had
been achieved."138 This was the case in Dobbs v. Lykes Bros. Steamship
1 1Id.
32 Moralesv. Gajal, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1359-60(5th Cir. 1987). See also L.C. Johnson v.
MarlinDrilling Co., 893 F.2d 77, 79 (5thCir. 1990) (holding maximum medical cure exists when
it appears probable further treatment will result in no betterment of the seaman!s condition).3 No. CIVk.96-0977, 1996 WL 537722 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1996).
"I Id. at *4.
I's Id. at*1.
-Id. at *4.
'Id.
"Pelotto v. L &N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Co.,39 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied a continued maintenance and cure request from a seaman
diagnosed with a non-fatal kidney ailment known as chronic
glomerulonephritis.' 0 The seaman in Dobbs received six months in-
patient treatment for his ailment' 4' and then, pursuant to a declaration from
the seaman's physician stating he was fit to return to work, the :eaman was
discharged from the hospital. 42 In denying the seaman's claim for
continued benefits, the court reasoned that once discharged, the seaman
had "received all the improvement in his condition reasonably expected
to result from nursing, care, and medical treatment."'143 Based on those
facts, the court concluded the seaman had reached the point ofmaximum
medical improvement.' 4"
139 243 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1957).
10 Id at 59, n. 3.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
I" Dobbs v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 243 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Stewart v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 288 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. La. 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1011 (1970) (the Pelotto court looked to the district court s rational, in Stewart to
resolve the maximum medical improvement issue). In Stewart, the United State!; District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied continued maintenance and cure to an epileptic seaman
who sought drug treatments to control his occasional seizures. The court reasoned once the
seaman was diagnosed with grand mal epilepsy, an incurable neurological disorder, any further
treatmentwould be palliative and not curative in nature. Stewart, 288 F. Supp. at 634. Future drug
therapy, according to the court, may have reduced the frequency and severity cf the seaman s
seizures, but would never totally eradicate them. Id. at 635. From this, the court declared that it
would be manifestly unjust to require the shipowner to provide future maintenaice and cure to
a seaman who came aboard the vessel a grand mal epileptic and left the vessAl a grand mal
epileptic. Id. To hold the shipownerto such an obligation, the court held, would be to make the
shipowner an unqualified insurer and grant the seaman a pension, both of which are outside the
scope of the doctrine of maintenance and cure. Id.
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THE COSTA CROCIERE v. ROSE DECISION
Many of the cases discussed above provide insight into the rationale
behind lower court application of the permanency rule. Seamen, by the
very nature of their occupation, are susceptible to a wide array of disease
and injury. 14 However, since the Supreme Court's decision in Vella,
medical advancement has been profound. Scientists have discovered
many cures and effective modes of treatment for injuries and ailments
once diagnosed as incurable or even fatal. Whether this means maximum
medical improvement under Pelotto is best suited to meet the individual
needs of injured or ill seamen, especially as the doctrine of maintenance
and cure enters the twenty-first century is unclear. The court in Costa
Crociere v. Rose adopted Pelotto's view when it extended maintenance
and cure benefits to a seaman diagnosed with an incurable kidney
disorder.14 In support of its decision not to terminate the medical benefits
of a terminally ill seaman, the court in Costa Crociere reasoned, "the
common law is nothing if not flexible, and must be adapted to fit the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each individual case."147 Accordingly,
we turn now to Costa Crociere.
In Costa Crociere v. Rose, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held maximum medical improvement could
only be achieved when it appeared further treatment would result in "no
betterment of the seaman's condition."'4 The court refused to restrict
itself to the permanency rule, applying instead the Fifth Circuit's Pelotto
test to extend indefinitely maintenance and cure benefits to a seaman
14s Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047).
6 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1558-59 (S.J. Fla. 1996).
147 Id. at 1549.14Ild. at 1558-59.
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diagnosed with an incurable and chronic kidney disorder.'49 Rather than
concern itself withbthe permanent nature of the seaman's chronic disease,
the court focused on the seaman's overall physical condition. 50 Aware
that dialysis treatment or a kidney transplant could mean the difference
between life and imminent death for the seaman, the court in Costa
Crociere concluded that either form of treatment had the potential to
improve the seaman's overall medical condition.'
Background
In Costa Crociere, the seaman "Rose" was a thirty-five year otd citizen of
Jamaica and a resident alien of the United States. 52 In May 1987, after
prolonged health problems and a series of medical examinations, Rose
was diagnosed with IgA nephropathy, a renal disease associated with
excessive immune deposits, a component of which is immunoglobulin
A." IgA nephropathy is an incurable kidney disease' 4 that may result in
a total loss of renal function; however, its exact cause is imknown.15
Without dialysis or a kidney transplant a patient with total renal failure
will die within weeks' 5
6
14 9 Id. While the Eleventh Circuit had not addressed the issue when maintenance and cure
benefits should terminate, the court in Costa Crociere looked to the former Fifth Circuit, whoso
decisions it considered binding. Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1549. In Bonner -v. Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
IS Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
't Id. at 1558-59.
M at 1540.
1
53 Id.
L Id.
us Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
'MId. at 1541. Rose's medical expert, Dr. David Roth, explained a dialysis patient suffering
from IgA nephropathy can expect a reasonable life expectancy. Costa's medical expert, Dr. Alan
Arieff, testified a dialysis patient suffering from IgA nephropathy can live ten to twenty years.
Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1541.
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In June 1994, while serving as a crew member aboard his employer's
ship, Rose suddenly became very ill and was removed from the ship for
emergency medical attention.157 Rose was found to have suffered total
renal failure158 and was placed immediately on kidney dialysi9 which
continued permanently three times per week.Yc9 Without dialysis or a
kidney transplant, Rose was sure to die within a matter of weeks.,
The specific question before the court in Costa Crociere was whether
Rose, who suffered from an incurable kidney disorder yet had been
stabilized through dialysis, had reached the point of maximum medical
improvement.16 On February 24, 1995, the shipowner filed a single-
count complaint seeking ajudicial declaration that Rose had reached the
point of maximum medical improvement and that there was no longer a
duty to provide Rose with maintenance and cure.163 The shipowner
claimed its obligation to provide maintenance and cure ended when
Rose's condition had been stabilized on dialysis after being transported
from the ship to a hospital on shore.'6 According to the shipowner
w IM at 1540.
'R Id. at 1541. A subsequent examination in November, 1994, revealed Rose suffered from
high blood pressure, softened bones, peripheral nerve difficulties and severe walking disabilities.
These conditions were attributable to his idney disorder. Costa Crocacre, 939 F. Supp. at 1541.
s Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1541.
'"Id. at 1541.
1 Id.
' Id. at 1539. The court limited the maintenance and cure issue to the specific question of
maximum medical improvement. The court, at this time, did not address Rose's obligation to seek
public funds to cover his living expenses and the cost of a transplant or continued dialysis. Id at
1558-59, n. 16.
Iad at 1540. Costa Crociere, S.p.A. (Costa) was the owner and operator of the vessel IV
American Adventure on which Rose worked. Another plaintiff to this action vas Family Hotel
Services, Inc. (FHS). P11S employed Rosewhile he served aboard the MVAmerican Adventure,
from early February 1994 until June 21, 1994, when he was removed from the ship for medical
care and treatment. Id at 1540. Hereinafter, both plaintifl will be collectively referred to as
Costa.
114 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1996). The court in Costa
Croctere was aware of Costa's contention that Rose knowingly failed to disclose his Iddney
disease at the time he was hired. Pursuant to the stipulation of the paties;, the court did not address
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maximum medical improvement had been reached; because further
treatment would merely sustain Rose's condition, but never cure it. 6' In
response, Rose argued that he had not yet reached the point of maximum
medical improvement; 6 ' since for Rose, either dialysis or a kidney
transplant "undoubtedly created a reasoned prospect of a betterment of his
condition."'67 Stated simply, such treatment meant the difference between
life and death.168
The court in Costa Crociere found itselftorn between two plausible
applications of maximum medical improvement: the established
permanency rule and the Pelotto test. Unfamiliar with any maintenance
and cure cases involving an incurable kidney disease requiring treatment
in order to sustain life,'69 the court distinguished the present case from
those cases where seamen sought continued maintenance and cure for pain
and suffering associated with an incurable disease or ailment. In no other
case did a seaman seek treatment which, unless remedied, would result in
immediate death. 7
In Belcher Towing Co. v. Howard,7 1 for example, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied continued
maintenance and cure to a seaman who sustained incurable neck and back
the disclosure issue at that time. IdL
"' Id. at 1556. As part of its underlying rationale, Costa argued: "When a seaman breaks his
arm, contracts afever in a foreign port, or develops diabetes, the shipowner can at least predict his
obligations under maintenance and cure and know when that obligation will end. The arm will
heal - either fully or as much as it is going to - and the shipowner's obligation will end. The
fever will run its course and the shipowner's obligation will end. But the day will never come
when Rose will be pronounced cured." Id.
16 6 Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1548.
6 Id.
I" Id. The court also noted in passing that Rose had applied for, and been denied, monthly cash
benefits and Medicare benefits under the Social Security disability program. Ide at 1558-59, n. 16.169 Costa Crociere, 939 F. Supp. at 1552.
170Id. at 1553.
" 638 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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injuries aboard the defendant's ship." The seaman's injuries were
essentially soft tissue in nature, and he complained of a constant lingering
sensationY173 As a result, he "embarked on a medical odyssey consisting
of hospitalizations and treatment by numerous physicians and
chiropractors."174 On the date of trial, the seaman had been seen or
treated by approximately nineteen physicians, and received therapy from
approximately seven different sources." Because there was no competent
medical evidence to support further orthopedic or neurological treatment
for his neck and back condition, the court concluded the seaman had
reached maximum medical improvement 76 The court reasoned there was
no prediction that, even within the standard of "reasonable medical
possibility," further treatment would effect a permanent improvement of
the seaman s alleged chronic and static condition.'7 As such, the
shipowner was no longer obligated to provide the seaman maintenance
and cure benefits. 78
Unlike the seaman in Belcher, the court in Costa Crociere was
convinced Rose had not yet received the maximum available benefits of
medical treatment. 79 Confronted with a situation where more than
alleviation ofpain and suffering was at stake for the seaman, and proposed
treatments offered a reasoned prospect of long-term survival, the court
determined maximum medical improvement under Pelotto was
appropriate.) s
Even though IgA nephropathy was deemed both incurable and fatal,
'nBelcher Towing Co., 638 F. Supp. at 242.173 d.
174 Id.
17S Id.
175 Belcher Towing Co. v. Howard, 638 F. Supp. 242, 244 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
1771 d. Because medical records revealed no objective signs of injury, the shipowner claimed
the lingering sensation -was psychological, not physical.
1' Belcher Towing Co., 638 F. Supp. at 244.
79 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
190 Id.
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the Costa Crociere court did not hesitate to extend Rose's maintenance
and cure benefits.'8' This seems contrary to Pelotto, where maximum
medical improvement cannot be reached until there is no possibility of a
betterment in the seaman's condition.'8 The Pelotto approach according
to the court, was best suited to meet the medical needs of a chronically ill
seaman, especially one who suffered a total renal failure.'83 In a life and
death situation, the court reasoned:
the rapid advance of contemporary medical knowledge, coupled
with the development of highly expensive, but extraordinarily
promising treatments like dialysis and transplantation, greatly
expanded the panoply of procedures that must be exhausted before
an ill or injured seaman reached the point at which no urther
betterment of his condition was conceivable. 114
The Costa Crociere court also noted that under Pelotto the word
'condition' "encompassed something more than the curability of the
specific disease or injury that triggered the need for maintenance and
cure."'185 A broad reading of the word condition, the court explained,
would permit "a court to tailor the remedial doctrine of maintenance and
cure to fit the unique facts and circumstances of the case before it."' 5
Rather than focusing on the chronic and incurable nature of Rose's
kidney disorder, the court focused on the combined effect treatment would
have on Rose!s overall physical health and bodily function."8 ' For Rose,
the court determined, "dialysis or a transplant would 'better' his overall
medical condition by removing toxins and replacing other vital kidney
"I d. at 1550-51.
In Pelotto v. L & N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396,400 (5th Cir. 1979).
183 Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1558-59 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
I"Id. at 1557.
115 Id. at 1550.
186 M.
137 Id.
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functions that were destroyed as a result of the disease.""' Dialysis and
transplantation would also improve other aspects of Rose's condition,
including his level of blood abnormalities, his overall body chemistry, his
cardiac function, and the responsiveness of his peripheral nerve system.I 9
These modes of treatment, the court reasoned, would do much more than
improve Rose's quality of life or simply make him feel better, they would
prolong his life and "make him healthier in the most marked and profound
sense."'
Costa Crociere's Impact on the Doctrine of
Maintenance and Cure
In its most basic sense, the court's decision in Costa Crociere stands for
the proposition that a seaman's right to maintenance and cure should not
be hindered by constrictive guidelines. Under Costa Crociere, a
shipowner's obligation to provide maintenance and cure could continue for
the remainder of an ill or injured seaman's life.191 Given the fact that the
Supreme Court has not confronted the maximum medical improvement
issue in over twenty years, it would be interesting to see how the current
Court would rule should the decision be appealed.
The doctrine of maintenance and cure was designed and intended to
hold the ship owner responsible for providing treatment necessary to nurse
the ill or injured seaman to an improved state of health.1 2 Over the years,
shipowners have relied on the limited scope of the maintenance and cure
doctrine, especially during the implementation of employment policies
and procedures. The shipowner's reaction to an open-ended duty to
provide maintenance and cure might result in more stringent health
' Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1996).IThIc
-
190 Id.
"
11d. at 1556-57
m Costa Crociere v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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screening processes for seamen prior to hiring. This could have two
possible effects.
First, prior to hiring, if the shipowner is completely informed of any
current and/or pre-existing diseases or injuries a seaman might have, he
could strategically place the seaman in ajob position best sdted to meet
his functional capacity, skill, and medical needs. This would have the
combined effect of promoting a safe and efficient work environment that
is free from unknown health risks and dangers, and would also ensure that
an ill or injured seaman receives necessary medical attention at the onset
of the voyage, thus reducing the likelihood of sudden, unexpected attacks
or even death.
Conversely, a stringent health screening policy may lead to
discrimination at the hiring stage. If the shipowner believes lie may have
to provide maintenance and cure for an indefinite duration, he may be
reluctant to hire the injured or ill seaman. Such a hiring policy would
violate the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,1 which provides
that "no employer shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."'194 The Act defines a disabled
person as one who:
(1) has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;"'19
19342 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 1 1990) [hereinafler ADA]. In addition to this federal statute,
nearly every state and the District of Columbia has enacted statutes that prohibit discrimination
against handicapped persons. See Chapman and Groh, supra note 26, 346 (citing Arthur S.
Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With Aids, 10 U. DAYTON L. RE.V. 681,
689-96 (1985)).
"4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 11990).
"s Chapman and Groh, supra note 26, at 345 (citing 42 U.S.C. ' 12102(2)(A) (Supp. H
1990)).
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(2) has a "record of such impairment;' 96 or
(3) is "regarded as having such impairment"' 197
Provided the ill or injured seaman fits within one of the categorical
provisions ofthe ADA, a shipowner's reluctance to hire the seaman may
inevitably result in both increased employment regulation and civil
litigation as a means of redressing personal grievances against the
shipowner.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion hopefully provides insight into the application
ofmaxinum medical improvement in light of the court's ruling in Costa
Crociere. As the doctrine of maintenance and cure sails into an era of
technological advancement the traditional application of the permanency
rule may ultimately give way to expectations of indefinite medical care
and treatment, extending well beyond the point at which a disease or
illness is diagnosed as incurable or permanent. However, to date, neither
Supreme Court precedent nor statutory authority warrants the imposition
of an open-ended duty to provide maintenance and cure.193 Moreover,
additional recovery by means of the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness
doctrine support the need to preserve the inherent limitations of the
maintenance and cure doctrine.
By agreeing that maintenance and cure should continue until the
seaman's incapacity is declared to be permanent,'9 9 the Vella court
effectively refined the permanency rule. Exactly how the Supreme Court
may one day choose to define maximum medical improvement is yet to
be determined. Nevertheless, until then, a medical diagnosis of
19 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (Supp. 11990)).
197 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (Supp. 111990)).
"~ See Vellav. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1,5(1975). Sc alsoArticleIVPagraiph 1 of The
Shipownei's Liability Convention, supra note 10.
'1 Vella, 421 U.S. at 5.
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permanency will remain the rule, not the exception.
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